Abstract-Companies can optimize their supply chain if they exchange item-level data, i.e. item-specific data gathered with the help of Radio Frequency Identification or 2D bar codes. Data can either be distributed over the repositories of each company or stored in a central repository. The distributed approach requires "discovering" the repositories which contain data about the queried item. Thus, data access is slow. The central approach does not require discovery, but the data owner has to relinquish access control to the repository provider. Both approaches are not satisfactory.
I. INTRODUCTION
More and more companies are implementing item-level tracking in their supply chains using Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) [18] or 2D bar codes. Each RFID tag or bar code carries a unique identifier for each good [33] . Companies are collecting information about the items they handle by scanning the identifier and recording it in their data repositories. Each tuple recorded consists of the item identifier, a timestamp, the location and situation-specific data.
The full benefit of this information can be gained when companies exchange their item-level data. For instance, applications like anti-counterfeiting [28] and targeted batch recalls [36] require that the path of each single item is tracked along the supply chain. This cannot be achieved with aggregated data. Despite the potential of such new applications, companies are reluctant to share item-level data [16] , [32] . This is because strategic relations or best practices might be inferred from the data. Furthermore, companies may suffer consequences for unfair behavior. Because of that companies need to selectively exchange item-level data with other companies in the supply chain. I.e., fine-grained policies need to be set. Consider the following example:
Example: It is common place, e.g., in the automotive industry, that suppliers sell their products to competing companies. Imagine a supplier S 1 selling a product p 1 to buyers B 1 and B 2 . If B 1 has access to all scheduled orders for p 1 , he can infer the volume of future business with B 2 . This can be very sensitive, in case S 1 has to cancel some orders due to a temporary capacity reduction, e.g., a machine failure. B 1 could then infer whether B 2 's orders are treated preferentially. While this decision can be based on local information in the case of bridging only one supply chain stage, it becomes difficult in case of a tier-2 supplier. Imagine a supplier S 2 selling product p 2 to S 1 which is then used to produce p 1 . If either B 1 or B 2 contacts S 2 requesting data, S 2 cannot decide which object was shipped to which buyer. If S 2 would grant access to all items, B 1 could infer again the volume of business of B 2 .
There are two main methods of exchanging item-level data: storing data locally at each company (distributed repositories), and storing the data centrally (central repository). These methods are discussed in detail in the following section. In summary, none of these methods is satisfactory: 1) Distributed Repositories: When data is distributed, one has to first "discover" which company and thereby which repositories contain data about each item [4] . This makes data access slower. And the discovery itself can reveal sensitive information. 2) Central Repository: A central repository does not require discovery. However, the data owner has to relinquish access control to the repository provider.
In this paper we present an encryption scheme for storing item-level data in a central data repository. This encryption scheme enables the data owners to enforce access control over their data, prevents observers of the central repository to infer any information and enables efficient queries on the stored data. It thereby reconciliates the conflict between security and performance in item-level data repositories.
In summary this paper makes the following contributions
• We present a novel encryption scheme that (1) enables the enforcement of item-level access control by the data owner, (2) is efficient in the number of keys required by the data owner, and (3) is confidential even against the service provider.
• We provide formal proofs that the proposed encryption scheme is secure.
• We introduce three ways of querying data with our encryption scheme that result in a different CPU load on clients and servers.
• Having evaluated the encryption scheme with databases containing up to 50 million tuples, we show that it is fast, scalable and that it can be parallelized very efficiently. Furthermore, we show under which parameters each query type will be the fastest.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Exchanging Item-Level Data
As already mentioned, there are two main methods of exchanging item-level data: (1) storing data locally at each company, and (2) storing the data centrally. For the sake of completeness, we also consider (3) storing the data on an RFID tag [29] . Distributed Repositories: Item-level data is usually partitioned horizontally and tuples corresponding to one item are spread across a number of repositories, e.g. because each company will store the data it gathers in its own repository. Nevertheless, the typical query searches for all tuples corresponding to one item (pedigree). Locating the repositories that contain information about one item is difficult. This is because companies usually do not know the complete supply chain of each item, such that they have to "discover" which companies possessed which items [4] . Proposals have been made for discovery servers that contain an index over all repositories [17] , [4] . However, they do not provide the appropriate level of security. Furthermore, data access becomes slower since data repositories have to be discovered before data can be queried.
Central Repository: When data is stored centrally, there is no need to locate the repositories. However, the data owner looses the control over who can access his data. He has to trust that the repository provider will enforce the access control as specified. And if the repository is compromised, all data about the whole supply chain might be revealed. Since business critical information can be inferred from this data, companies need to stay in control over their data.
Data-on-Tag: While companies can easily exchange data by storing it on the RFID tags, it poses many security risks. If data is unencrypted, it might be read at any time by any person. If data is encrypted, key management becomes a problem. Consider the example from the previous section: Since items produced by S 2 will be sold to competing companies, data about each item needs to be encrypted with a different key. Furthermore, the information flow is only in one direction, i.e. from manufacturer to consumer, and data cannot be updated after an item leaves your company.
B. Visibility Policies
Specifying fine-granular access control for item-level data can quickly become unmanageable. Therefore one needs a policy model to efficiently specify the most common access control. Visibility policies [27] have been developed for this purpose.
Visibility policies are an extension of attribute-based access control (ABAC). In ABAC the decision whether an access is granted is determined based on the attributes of subject, object and environment [39] .
There are sets of attributes for subjects, objects and environment. For each subject, object or environment there is an assignment AT T R() of a subset of these attributes. A policy rule is a Boolean function of the attributes of subject, object and environment of the request. If the function evaluates to true given the assignment of attributes, access is granted; otherwise it is denied.
Visibility policies do not fit the ABAC model of [39] . In item-level sharing, subjects are companies and objects are items. A company (subject) is requesting access to data of a specific item (object). This access should be granted, if the item (object) has been in possession of the company (subject). Therefore visibility policies implement a combined subject, object attribute [27] .
Let AT T R(s, o) be the assignment function of combined subject, object attributes for subject s and object o. If object o has been in possession of subject s, then "vis" ∈ AT T R(s, o). One can now efficiently write policy rules implementing visibility policies, e.g., granting access to all supply chain partners for their items, but excluding a competitor "Charlie":
III. RELATED WORK Our encryption scheme is related to outsourced database security and searchable encryption. Security in outsourced databases or database as a service models [23] has received significant attention recently. One avenue of research is enabling additional functionality preferably without violating security objectives. In [19] SQL queries have been enabled on encrypted, outsourced databases. In [12] , [8] queries have been enabled by storing additional index information. Additional metadata for queries has been provided in [11] . A better way for handling range queries is presented in [24] . Aggregation queries using homomorphic encryption have been proposed in [21] , but a later evaluation showed insufficient performance [25] . Key management techniques optimizing the performance of queries have been proposed in [22] . We present efficient methods for a subset of those queries. In [13] , [14] algorithms are presented to compress the number of keys necessary for any access control matrix in encrypted, outsourced data storage. This pure access control approach does not allow queries on the encrypted data as we deem necessary.
Furthermore, due to the nature of visibility policies, the resulting number of encryption keys can be huge. Its worstcase complexity is on the order of "number of items" times "number of parties". By restricting ourselves to visibility policies we achieve "number of items" plus "number of parties".
Another avenue of research is enabling additional protection goals preferably without sacrificing functionality. In [20] , [30] integrity mechanisms have been presented. Durability (write once-read many) has been added as a protection goal in [34] . We consider integrity and confidentiality as our protection goals.
A common problem for outsourced databases is hiding the access pattern. The most recent advances based on oblivious RAM are described in [37] . Access time is polylogarithmic in the size of the databases. Note that this protection mechanism prevents query operations by the service provider, such that only simple storage can be outsourced.
Searchable encryption is one way of implementing searches by the service provider on the outsourced database. It combines encryption with query capabilities. The first, practical methods for symmetric encryption have been proposed in [35] . Security definitions and a novel construction are described in [9] . We use deterministic encryption and achieve sublinear search time, which has been proposed and proven necessary in [5] . Nevertheless, in our proposal no plaintext is ever revealed to the data repository. We deterministically encrypt the primary key of the database for fast indexing and then rely on key security and management. The extension of searchable encryption to public-key encryption was described in [6] . It was later noted in [2] that public-key searchable encryption is just a special form of identity-based encryption.
An open problem not addressed by this previous work is enabling multiple users to share an outsourced database. A partial solution using access control is presented in [10] . For searchable encryption preliminary attempts exist based on proxy re-encryption [15] and new security assumptions [38] . We have built multi-user encryption scheme tailored for queries on RFID databases. These types of queries have been described in [3] .
IV. ENCRYPTION SCHEME FOR ITEM-LEVEL DATA Our idea is to store all data in a central repository. On the one hand, this has the advantage compared to each company storing its data in its own data repository that there is no directory necessary of which repositories contain information about which item. A querying party does not first have to locate the repositories to query, but can immediately query the data. On the other hand, this has the disadvantage compared to several independent data repositories that the data owner loses control over his data and can no longer enforce access control. We overcome this disadvantage with a novel encryption scheme.
A. Overview
As already mentioned, we target a scenario with a central repository. Our security requirements for the central repository are 1) A party observing the central repository should not be able to track items. 2) A party should be able to enforce fine-grained visibility policies on its items. The first requirement is important in order to protect against attacks introduced by a central repository. One can imagine an attacker that continuously monitors the central repository and tries to infer as much information as possible. We would like to restrict such an attacker to gaining as little information as possible.
The second requirement implies fine-grained access control policies. It is a functional requirement on the security mechanism. We anticipate that a data owner has different trust relationships with different parties and he should be able to set the access control policies accordingly. In particular, we map the policy model of visibility policies to the following levels of access control: A1: for each tuple A2: for each party, all tuples corresponding to items that the party possessed A3: for each party, all tuples corresponding to items that the data owner previously possessed Note that one can enforce access control on an attribute level for all three levels of access control by encrypting attributes with additional private keys.
The first level A1 allows setting any arbitrary policy on a tuple-level. It allows implementing the full spectrum of attribute-based access control at the cost of managing a large number of keys.
The second level A2 of access control is particularly useful for item-level tracking. It allows restricting the visibility of items to someone who possessed the item without having to set access control to individual items. One can then engage in fair data sharing agreements with other parties without the risk of disclosing information about other supply chain partnerseven by inference. This is the basic notion of visibility policies combined with an authorization for a specific party. Without loss of generality let that party be Alice, then we express the access control level A2 as
Such visibility policies can be implemented using tuple-level access control, but we significantly reduce the number of managed keys.
The third level A3 enables including trusted parties, e.g. outsourced manufacturers or service providers. They get full access to the data of their trusting partner. This level implements access control orthogonal to visibility policies based on the ownership of the data in the central repository. Using an example, let Alice be the service provider and Bob be the party granting access. Then we express the access control level A3 as Consider implementing these requirements with traditional cryptography: in both symmetrical and asymmetrical encryption, one key or one key pair would be required for each tuple and for each party. Since an average supply chain produces millions of items with hundreds of supply chain partners, these methods would result in a huge number of cryptographic keys. Furthermore, cryptographic keys would need to be exchanged between parties for each item/tuple produced. Thus, both methods are unpractical.
We follow a different approach: we propose a new cryptographic scheme which only requires a random number for each item, and two cryptographic keys. And it only requires cryptographic keys to be exchanged once, i.e. new items/tuples do not require an exchange of new cryptographic keys. Our cryptographic scheme stores encrypted data in a central repository. Our extensive evaluation shows that data processing is scalable and that it can be parallelized very efficiently.
Our cryptographic scheme requires tuples containing two values:
• I: a unique identifier for the combination of one item and one party • D: encrypted data Note that I will uniquely identify D, therefore it can be used to query D from the repository.
The challenge of our cryptographic scheme is to on the one hand prevent an observer from inferring information about an item or company from I, but on the other hand let legitimate queries efficiently identify the tuples containing I.
We describe our cryptographic scheme following the steps in its basic procedure, cf. Figure 1: 1) Company i receives or produces an item which is equipped with an unique ID 2) Company i collects data about this item, encrypts it, and stores it in the data repository 3) Company i sells the item, i.e. it sends it to Company i+1 4) Later, Company i+1 can query and decrypt item-level data that Company i stored in the repository
B. Encrypting Data
Our cryptographic scheme requires a random number r for each item which every party in possession of the item can access. For instance, r might be written to an RFID tag attached to the item during its manufacturing. In case of 2D barcodes or other non-electronic tracking methods, the unique identifier of the item itself must contain sufficient randomness.
Let g be a generator of group G p of prime order p. We assume that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in G p is hard. 
C. Decrypting Data
Before querying data about an item r, Company i+1 must obtain access privileges from Company i. Company i may now grant access at one or more of the three levels defined before. A1: Company i reveals K = P RF (g bir ) for one specific item. Company i+1 calculates I = (g ai ) r with the public key g ai and the random number r associated to the item. It may then query the tuple with I and decrypt D with K. A2: Company i reveals the semi-public key g bi . Company i+1 may then compute K = P RF ((g bi ) r ) and I = (g ai ) r for the random numbers from all previous and future items. For each item it can then can query the tuple containing I and decrypt the corresponding D using K. A3: Company i reveals g bi and all r. Company i+1 may then access each item r as before.
D. Ensuring Authenticity through Signatures
So far, we have only considered confidentiality of stored item-level data in the repository. Given access at levels A2 or A3 a company could nevertheless forge entries for parties whose data it has access to. We therefore implement the following mechanism to preserve integrity (authenticity). Note that -similar to short signatures [7] -our mechanism only requires one additional group element.
Company i maintains a further private key c i . Let h be a generator of group G p also of prime order p. When storing data g air , E P RF (g b i r ) (x) in the central repository, it also supplies h aicir . Let h ci be a public key for Company i. In order to verify the integrity of the information supplied, the central repository uses a bilinear map. A bilinear map is a functionê : G×G → G T with the following properties:
Definition 2: We say that the Symmetric External Diffie Hellman (SXDH) assumption holds, if there exists a bilinear mapê : G × G → G T and the DDH assumption holds in G and G'.
The central data repository verifies thatê(g air , h ci ) = e(g, h aicir ). Then and only then it allows entries to be written.
E. Querying Tuples
Encrypting the data with our cryptographic scheme solves many privacy and security concerns. However, it makes querying data complicated. This is because a party querying data usually does not know which companies in the supply chain actually possessed an item. We will present three different ways of querying data from the repository.
Let C be the set of all companies that might have possessed an item, e.g. all companies in a certain industry segment. Recall that tuples generated by Company i ∈ C will have the form (I, D) = (g air , E(x)). A party that possessed an item associated with a random number r might query the repository as follows:
• Client-side Computation: For all i ∈ C, the party will use the public key g ai to calculate I = g air , and then retrieve the corresponding tuple(s) from the repository.
• Server-side Computation: The party will calculate g r and send it to the repository. The repository will check for all i ∈ C ifê(g r , g ai ) ==ê(g, g air ), and return the tuples for which the condition turns out to be true. 
. This way each party with appropriate access rights can follow the information about each item up and down the supply chain. Each query type will be suited for different scenarios. The performance considerations, e.g. under which parameters will each query type be the fastest, will be assessed in detail in Section VI. Note that even though two of these query types rely on brute force, i.e. doing computations for all elements in C, they can be easily distributed and computed quickly.
If a company is only querying the tuples corresponding to one item, the service provider might infer which tuples belong to one item, and thus infer the length of the supply chain. This can be avoided by querying the tuples of many items at once or by including random tuples from other items in the query.
Note that each company can check and thus ensure that the random number r that they choose is unique inside their company. However, across companies the random number r might not be unique. This is not a problem for Client-side Computation and Chaining, since for different companies i and j it is true that (g ai ) r = (g aj ) r . Queries using Serverside Computation might return duplicate items. However, if the querying company does not have access rights for those items, i.e. it neither knows g bir nor g bi , it will not be able to decrypt the data. Thus duplicate values of r do not pose a problem.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now need to analyze whether our proposed scheme fulfills its security requirements. We emphasize that the security requirements were designed in order to enable the same level of security in a centralized repository as in several independent data repositories. This way we can combine the advantages of both -efficient searches like in a centralized repository and strict data control as with several independent data repositories.
We use game-based security proofs where an adversary plays a game with a challenger. The adversary is put into a position of trying to break one of our security requirements. We can show that if he succeeds, we can use this adversary to break common security assumptions. We do this by simulating an environment given a challenge for the hard problem that is indistinguishable from the view in a real attack.
A. Anonymity
An attacker might try to infer knowledge about an item by observing the repository. We play the following game 
C. Access Control Level A2
An attacker might try to gain access to additional items he did not possess. We play the following game Game A2 : An adversary A is given the public key g bi for Company i and encrypted data D from i for an item r he never possessed (and consequently does not know r). If the adversary can return key K to decrypt D, i.e. K = P RF (g bir ), he wins the game. Let Adv A2 = |P r[K = P RF (g bir )]| be the adversary's advantage in game Game A2 .
Theorem 3: The adversary's advantage Adv A2 is negligible in the security parameter, if the DDH assumption in G holds.
Proof: The proof is almost analogous to the proof of Theorem 2 only that A is handed g a instead of K i and D i . We omit details for brevity.
D. Access Control Level A3
In access control level A3 the party granted access has access to all items of the other company. Therefore there is no obvious attack by that party. Attacks by outsiders not granted any access are subclasses of the cases presented above.
E. Integrity
An attacker might try to store entries for another party in the central repository. We play the following game 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we will evaluate how our cryptographic scheme performs under different circumstances with the three proposed query types. We first analyze the total runtime of each query type disregarding parallelism, and discuss which parameters influence the runtime of each query type. After that, we analyze how the queries can be efficiently parallelized. We then use the results of the experiments to determine under which circumstances each query type is the fastest.
A. Experimental Setup
Our implementation is based on elliptical curves. We use the same group as [26] , i.e. G 1 = E(F p )[ ] where p is a prime number longer than 512 Bit, and one that is 160 Bit long. The parameters a i , b i , c i and r are also 160 Bit long. Note that the length of the keys is sufficient, since 160 Bit in elliptic curves provides similar security to 1024 Bit RSA [1] . For the encryption of D we use 128-Bit AES.
The parameters influencing the runtime of our cryptographic scheme are: the overall number of companies |C|, the number of companies that possessed an item |L|, and the number of tuples in the repository |DB|. We generate data to mimic a large supply chain, with the maximum size of the parameters being |C| = 10, 000; |L| = 100; and |DB| = 50 million.
Our fully functional prototype was implemented in Java (1.6.0_12, 64-Bit), using java.math.BigInteger as a large number arithmetic library. We executed the code on a Linux server with 64GB RAM, and 4 quad-core 64-Bit CPUs with 2.40GHz. The tuples were stored on a dedicated Linux server with 3GB RAM, a dual-core 32-Bit CPU with 3GHz, running PostgreSql 8.4. 
B. Overall Runtime without Parallelization
In this experiment we want to measure the overall runtime of each query type for querying data about one item. We perform selections based on equality. Indices can be built straightforwardly, since the encryption is deterministic. The queries benefit differently from parallelism. Therefore we disabled it to compare the runtime on only one CPU core. We will analyze the effects of parallelism on subsequent experiments. We set |C| = 100, |DB| = 1 million, and we vary |L| between 10 and 100. Note that we do not consider the time needed to gather the public keys g ai , since the keys can be cached and thus need only to be gathered once regardless of the actual number of items and queries.
We expect that the runtime of Client-side Computation and of Server-side Computation to be independent of |L|, since calculations are undertaken for all i ∈ C. The runtime of Chaining should increase linearly with the size of |L|, since a higher number of companies that possessed an item will result in more computations. Figure 2 depicts the median of 20 runs. We do not plot the time needed to decrypt the actual data (D = E K (x)). Decrypting takes around 4ms per tuple and it is the same for all query types. Our expectations are fulfilled. The runtime of Chaining depends on two values: fetching tuples from the database, and decrypting the IDs of the previous and next tuple. Both values increase linearly with the size of |L|. This is because for each party l ∈ L that possessed an item, one tuple has to be fetched, and two values have to be decrypted. Neither value can be improved through parallelization, since each step needs data from the previous step. The time for fetching tuples includes the Round Trip Time (RTT) in our local network, which was lower than 0.5 milliseconds. In the Internet the RTT might have a very large influence on the runtime, e.g. a RTT of 100ms would increase the runtime for |L| = 100 by 10 seconds. Note that in general the runtime of Client-side Computation on one CPU core will be 3 times lower than the runtime of Server-side Computation. However, Server-side Computation might still be the preferred query type. This is because Client-side Computation would require a large number of computers on the client side, resulting in large investments and thus reducing the advantages of delegating computations to a service provider.
C. Runtime for fetching Tuples
In this experiment we analyze the runtime for fetching tuples from the database for the queries Client-side Computation and Server-side Computation. As already mentioned, fetching tuples for Chaining cannot be parallelized, since each tuple fetched will depend on the previously fetched tuple. We measure the runtime in dependence of the total number of companies |C| and of the number of tuples in database |DB|. The measurements include the time for sending the query to the database, i.e. for sending g r or all I = g ai r which are to be selected.
We expect that the size of |DB| will have a small influence on the runtime. This is because tuples can be found very efficiently using an index. And we expect the runtime to increase linearly with |C|. This is because for each company i ∈ C, one tuple has to be fetched from the database. The size of |DB| has a very small influence on the runtime. This is because tuples can be found efficiently using an index. The size of the index was around 1GB for 50 million tuples. Considering that modern servers can have up to 500GB of RAM [31] , one computer might be able to efficiently manage billions of tuples. The runtime of fetching tuples increases almost linearly with the number of companies |C|. For C = 1, 000 the runtime is high, around 1000ms. However, this can be parallelized very well by replicating the database, i.e. the runtime for fetching tuples will decrease by a factor of n when fetching 1/n of all tuples in parallel from n computers with the same data.
D. Parallelization of Cryptographic Computations
In this set of experiments we analyze how well the cryptographic computations of queries Client-side Computation and Server-side Computation can be parallelized. We experiment how parallelization behaves with up to 16 CPU cores. Note that the computations for query Chaining cannot be parallelized, since tuples are fetched and decrypted sequentially.
We expect that the cryptographic computations will scale very well to a large number of cores, since the computations can be carried out independently of each other. And threads do not need to synchronize during computations, they only need to return the result of the computation.
First, we determined that the runtime of cryptographic computations for each query scales linearly with the total number of companies |C|. For each i ∈ C, Client-side Computation calculates one scalar multiplication in around 5ms, and Serverside Computation calculates one pairing in around 13ms. Both queries can be parallelized very well. Figure 4 There is a small increase in runtime with 16 cores because computations will be carried out on the CPU core running the thread that coordinates the other threads.
E. Parameters for which each Query is the fastest
After analyzing the performance of all three query types, we want to determine under which circumstances each query is the fastest. We measured the performance of all functions inside of each query type with different parameters, and devised mathematical functions to describe their behavior. These are consistent with the results presented so far: The runtime of queries Client-side Computation and Server-side Computation increases linearly with the total number of companies |C|, and it decreases inverse linearly with the number of CPU cores used.
First we compared the performance of Client-side Computation and Server-side Computation. The first query is about 3 times faster than the second one when running with the same parameters. The runtime of query Chaining increases linearly with the number of companies that possessed an item |L|.
We compared Client-side Computation to Chaining. The results are plotted in Figure 5 . We do not show the results for the comparison between Server-side Computation and Chaining because the graph differs by a constant factor, i.e. it is very similar to this one and thus yields no new insight. The surface area shows the parameters for which both queries have the same performance. For a given scenario one can use this graph to decide which query is faster, i.e. if the point corresponding to the given parameters lies below the surface area, then query Chaining is faster. If it lies above it, then query Client-side Computation is faster. For scenarios in which a small number of parties possess an item, query Chaining is very fast. Because of that, query Client-side Computation would only be faster with a huge number of CPU cores. With an increasing size of the number of companies that possessed an item |L|, query Client-side Computation is faster using a smaller number of CPU cores.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a novel cryptographic scheme for the secure exchange of item-level data along the supply chain. It stores encrypted data in a data repository, thus less trust in the repository is needed -confidentiality and authenticity are maintained even against the repository service provider. Also a party with full access to the repository cannot infer or forge any information. Furthermore, different levels of fine-grained access control can be enforced, e.g. on each item, without the need to exchange new cryptographic keys.
We present three ways of querying the repository: One query that relies on computations on the client side, one that relies on computations on the server side, and one that queries tuples sequentially. The last query is very fast for small supply chains. And the other two can be parallelized to achieve a near optimal speed-up. This is confirmed by a performance evaluation with a database containing up to 50 million tuples.
